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2.

Unilateral Refusals to License in the
US1
Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark D. Janis and
Mark A. Lemley

I.

INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

Most antitrust claims relating to intellectual property involve challenges to
agreements, licensing practices or affirmative conduct involving the use or
disposition of the intellectual property rights or the products they cover. But
sometimes an antitrust claim centers on an intellectual property owner’s
refusal to use or license an intellectual property right, perhaps coupled with
efforts to enforce the intellectual property right against infringers.2 The
allegation may be that the intellectual property right is so essential to
competition that it must be licensed across the board, or that a refusal to
license it to one particular party was discriminatory, or that in context a
refusal to license helped a monopolist to acquire or maintain market power.
Claims based on a unilateral refusal to license – the subject of this
chapter – present important issues at the center of the tension between
antitrust and intellectual property. The antitrust and intellectual property laws
are not necessarily in conflict. For the most part they serve complementary
goals, though each must limit the scope of the other. Unilateral refusal to
license cases, however, cut to the heart of the intellectual property owner’s
right to exclude others from practicing the intellectual property.3 As such,
efforts to invoke antitrust law in this context deserve special scrutiny.
Section II reviews the basic principles relating to unilateral refusals to
license intellectual property rights. Section III discusses in detail the various
sets of circumstances in which antitrust plaintiffs argue for exceptions to
those basic rules. Section IV distinguishes unilateral from concerted and
conditional refusals to deal.
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II.
A.

Antitrust, Patents and Copyright

BASIC PRINCIPLE: NO GENERAL DUTY TO
LICENSE
No Duty to Use IP At All4

The starting point for understanding the unilateral refusal to license cases is
the fundamental principle that an intellectual property owner has no
obligation to use its right at all. In patent cases, this principle was established
in the 1908 Supreme Court decision of Continental Paper Bag v. Eastern
Paper Bag.5 In that case, Eastern owned a patent describing a machine for
making ‘self-opening’ paper bags. Eastern never used the machine described
in the patent, and did not license it to others. When it sued Continental for
infringing the patent, Continental defended on the ground that it would be
inequitable to enforce the patent because Eastern wasn’t using the patented
machine, and was merely trying to use the patent to suppress competition.
The district court found that ‘complainant stands in the common class of
manufacturers who accumulate patents merely for the purpose of protecting
their general industries and shutting out competitors.’6 While the Supreme
Court accepted this explanation, it nonetheless reversed. The court noted that
‘such exclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the right
conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any owner of property to use
or not use it, without question of motive.’7
Congress has since codified the patent owner’s right to refuse to use the
patent. Section 271(d)(4) provides that a patent owner cannot be deemed
guilty of misuse by virtue of its refusal to use or license the patent.8
Copyright and trade secret laws similarly condone non-use and nondisclosure of the rights in question. Indeed, in trade secrecy the effective
concealment of the secret is a prerequisite to protection, and courts discuss
licensing in terms of whether licensing is inconsistent with continued
protection.9 Compelled licensing would therefore be inconsistent with trade
secret protection. Copyright owners have since 1976 been entitled to protect
both published and unpublished works, and indeed copyright protection is
somewhat more powerful for unpublished works due to the copyright owner’s
stronger interest in preventing use of the work.10 Trademark law, by contrast,
does require use in commerce as a prerequisite for protection. But the use in
question must be made by (or inure to the benefit of) the trademark owner
itself; trademark law strictly regulates efforts to license marks to third parties.
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Right to Enforce IP; No General Compulsory Licensing

Concomitant with the general right to refuse to use an intellectual property
right is the right to enforce that intellectual property right against infringing
use by others. A ‘right’ to refrain from using intellectual property would be a
hollow thing indeed if the intellectual property owner could not prevent
others from infringing the right. Since intellectual property laws merely
confer the right to exclude others from doing certain things, they can only be
enforced by resort to the courts. As the Court put it in Continental Paper Bag,
‘the right can only retain its attribute of exclusiveness by a prevention of its
violation. Anything but prevention takes away the privilege which the law
confers upon the patentee.’11 Copyright decisions have similarly confirmed
that copyright owners may refuse to license their rights, and may enforce
those rights by lawsuit.12
It is periodically suggested, however, that even if an intellectual property
owner can enforce an unused right, the enforcement of that right ought to be
limited to a right to recover damages rather than an entitlement to injunctive
relief. Such an approach would effectively constitute a judicially-created
compulsory licensing scheme. Instead of a property rule, to which intellectual
property owners are normally entitled,13 the court would be substituting a
liability rule. A few courts have refused to grant injunctions in the patent
context where inventions related to public health or safety are at issue. For
example, in Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge,14 the patentee owned a patent for
the treatment of raw sewage. It successfully sued a sewage treatment plant for
infringement. The court refused to grant an injunction, however, because
doing so would force the public to put up with untreated sewage. The
patentee was instead relegated to a damages remedy.15 The Supreme Court
has also suggested in the copyright context that injunctive relief may not
always be appropriate against infringers who have nonetheless contributed
substantial new material to an infringing work.16
These cases are small exceptions to a broad rule, however. The intellectual
property laws contain no general provision for compulsory working or
licensing of intellectual property rights. While courts have occasionally
refused to enjoin infringing uses where some sort of overriding public interest
was at stake, they have generally done so on the basis of intellectual property
rather than antitrust principles. Antitrust law does not itself impose an
obligation to use or license intellectual property rights, such that a refusal to
use or license the right would violate the antitrust laws. Further, such an
obligation would – unlike the vast majority of the antitrust rules we discuss in
this text – conflict directly with the rights granted to an intellectual property
owner by the intellectual property laws. Thus, as a general rule there is no
antitrust obligation either to use or license a patent.17
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C.

Antitrust, Patents and Copyright

Right to Refuse to Deal with Specific Customers

A variant of the argument that an intellectual property owner may be
compelled to use or license its right is the argument that the intellectual
property owner cannot discriminate in the grant of licenses once it does make
them available. This is a common species of antitrust complaint; plaintiffs
frequently argue that they have been unfairly disadvantaged because their
competitor got a license and they didn’t, or because their competitor got a
license on more favorable terms. In this section, we deal only with claims of
unilateral refusals to license.18
Antitrust law is generally hostile to such claims, even where intellectual
property rights are not at issue. The Court’s repeated invocation of the rule
that the antitrust laws ‘protect competition, not competitors’19 seems
applicable here. Thus, in Olympia Equip. Leasing v. Western Union
Telegraph,20 Judge Posner noted that ‘it is clear that a firm with lawful
monopoly power has no general duty to help its competitors, whether by
holding a price umbrella over their heads or by otherwise pulling its
competitive punches.’21 An antitrust violation is even less likely where the
intellectual property owner does not compete directly with the disfavored
licensee; absent some showing of monopoly leveraging it is not clear what
incentive the intellectual property owner would have to try to eliminate
competition in the downstream market.
Where a license has been granted and is later revoked, some courts have
seen the issue differently, suggesting some sort of legal obligation to continue
an existing business relationship.22 Even then, imposing such an obligation is
unusual. Olympia Leasing itself rejected an obligation to continue dealing
with a competitor.23 In the intellectual property context, Miller Insituform v.
Insituform of North America held that an exclusive patent licensee did not
violate the antitrust laws when it terminated a sublicense to the plaintiff and
instead entered the market itself.24 The court held that by terminating the
license the exclusive licensee ‘merely exercised his power to exclude others
from using the Insituform process, as was its right’ under the patent laws.25
Where intellectual property licenses are at issue, there are even stronger
policy reasons than normal not to impose a nondiscrimination obligation in
the choice of licensees. The purpose of intellectual property rights is to
encourage innovation by granting their owner a reward better than it could
obtain in a competitive market. Sometimes that reward is maximized if the
intellectual property owner uses the right itself and does not license it to
others. But it may be rational for intellectual property owners to license their
rights to others for a number of reasons. They may be ill-equipped to make
the protected product; they may want a revenue stream without having to
invest in producing and selling the product; they may wish to reserve one
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geographic or product market to themselves, while allowing others to exploit
the intellectual property right elsewhere; or they may simply feel that broad
dissemination of their product will redound to their benefit (for example,
because there is value in having their product become an industry standard).
Economic theory encourages licensing, because it allows the market to
transfer the intellectual property right to the most productive user of that
right.26 But efficient licenses will often be exclusive in nature, or at least
restricted in geographic scope, field of use, or extent or duration of use. If an
intellectual property owner who once licenses a right is thereafter compelled
to make licenses available to all comers on substantially equal terms, the
likely effect will be to discourage licensing altogether. Certainly the effect
would be to prohibit exclusive licensing, which is often the most efficient
means of extracting value from an intellectual property right.27
As a result, some courts have proposed a general rule: ‘A patent holder
who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act for maintaining the monopoly power he lawfully acquired by
refusing to license the patent to others.’28 This proposed per se rule of legality
is somewhat stronger than the rule in non-intellectual property cases. Outside
the intellectual property context, unilateral refusals to deal with specific
customers on nondiscriminatory terms are generally illegal only if the subject
of the refusal is an ‘essential facility’. We discuss the application of the
essential facilities doctrine to intellectual property, and the more general
question of whether a unilateral refusal to license intellectual property can
ever violate the antitrust laws, in more detail below.29
D.

Policy Basis; Practical Problems with Contrary Rule

The fundamental basis for permitting most unilateral refusals to use or license
an intellectual property right should be clear from the preceding sections.
Unlike the Walker Process or sham litigation cases,30 the cases we are
considering involve a valid right infringed by others. Intellectual property law
generally permits owners to enforce their rights by means of an injunction,
and does not compel them to use or license those rights to others. For antitrust
law to reach a contrary conclusion would require it to make illegal precisely
the same conduct that the intellectual property laws explicitly authorize.
Doing so would significantly reduce the innovation incentive intellectual
property provides, not only to those who refuse to use the invention at all, but
also to those who wish to license their rights only under certain conditions.
The practical problems with a compulsory working or licensing scheme
further counsel against such a rule. In the first place, it is worth noting that
many – perhaps a majority – of patented inventions are simply impractical to
use. The invention may cost too much to implement, or the market may not
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exist for it. A rule that required all patents to be offered for license would
simply result in wasted expenditures in many cases. It would also prevent a
patentee from choosing to exploit only one of many competitive technologies
it has developed, and therefore might have the effect of punishing innovators
who work along parallel lines.31 Alternatively, should antitrust law seek to
compel the licensing only of truly valuable technologies, it would be put to
the nearly impossible task of defining and then determining which intellectual
property rights should fit into that category.32 Similarly, if the obligation is
that the patentee work its invention, someone will have to determine whether
the patentee is satisfying that requirement by evaluating the patentee’s
products, by resolving disputes over uses in different sub-fields, and so on.
Even more problematic is that a court that imposed a duty to license must
engage in price regulation of the license. A rule that requires licensing but
lets the licensor set the price is easily evaded by the licensor setting an
exorbitant royalty. So any scheme that requires the intellectual property
owner to license its rights must also include some (presumably judicial, but
perhaps administrative) mechanism for pricing those rights. Such a system
should in turn probably have continuing oversight over the rates charged,
since their reasonableness may change over time.33 The specter of ongoing
judicial intervention in product pricing goes a long way towards explaining
why antitrust law avoids compelling licenses altogether in most
circumstances.

III.

CIRCUMSTANCES ALLEGED TO GIVE RISE TO A
DUTY TO LICENSE

As noted in the previous section, there is no general duty under either the
intellectual property or antitrust laws to use or license an intellectual property
right. Most of the cases that are litigated in this area therefore allege specific
factual circumstances that might give rise to an exception to this general rule.
Generally speaking, exceptions to the rule are rare, and normally involve
circumstances in which an intellectual property owner has sought to expand
the scope of its right beyond what the intellectual property laws grant it. In
this section, we consider the claims most commonly made for exceptional
duties to license.
A.

Market Power Prerequisite

At the outset, it is worth emphasizing that we are dealing in this chapter only
with purely unilateral refusals to deal.34 Unilateral conduct is actionable if at
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all under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, where it helps a party to acquire or
maintain monopoly power. Thus, in each of the factual circumstances
discussed here, proof that the defendant has or is likely to obtain monopoly
power is a necessary prerequisite to an antitrust claim. In the absence of
monopoly power, there is no set of circumstances in which a truly unilateral
refusal to license can violate the antitrust laws.35 Even Section 2 claims based
on conduct also addressed in other antitrust statutes, such as tying or
exclusive dealing, require proof of market power if they are brought as
challenges to unilateral conduct under Section 2.
Similarly, because unilateral refusals to deal will be illegal if at all under
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the other attributes of the rule of reason must
be satisfied. In particular, antitrust defendants should have the opportunity to
demonstrate procompetitive justifications for their conduct. Proof that a
unilateral refusal to license was on net pro- rather than anticompetitive should
dispose of a claim under the rule of reason.36
B.

Invalid Intellectual Property Rights

It is also important to emphasize that this chapter deals only with refusals to
license valid intellectual property rights. Similarly, to the extent it discusses
liability for bringing an infringement lawsuit, we deal here only with
situations where the infringement claim is supported by probable cause.
Many Section 2 claims have at their heart the argument that the intellectual
property in question was obtained by fraud, is invalid, or is not infringed, and
the intellectual property owner is knowingly enforcing this invalid right in
order to obtain a competitive advantage.37
C.

Essential Facilities Doctrine38

1. Background; criticism of doctrine
One possible antitrust approach to refusals to use or license an intellectual
property right does not focus on conduct at all. Instead, the argument is that
certain monopolies inherently give rise to a duty to deal fairly with all
comers. Courts sometimes hold that a monopolist has a duty to deal with
competitors, or at least to continue a relationship once it has begun. Under
this doctrine, the monopoly owner of an ‘essential facility’ for competition
may be forced to give access to that facility to competitors on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms. The essential facilities doctrine is unique in that a
monopolist’s status (as the owner of the facility and a competitor in the
market that relies on the facility) rather than any affirmative conduct
determines liability.39
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The essential facilities doctrine grew out of a number of cases in which a
vertically integrated company (or a group of them) had exclusive control over
some facility, and used that control to gain an advantage over competitors in
an adjacent or downstream market. Most of the canonical cases have this
basic structure. Thus, in Terminal Railroad, a group of railroads jointly
owned a key bridge over the Mississippi River and accompanying rail yard,
and refused to give competing railroads use of the facilities.40 In Otter Tail,
the public utility that owned all the transmission lines into a municipality
refused to allow the municipality to ‘wheel’ power over those lines from
outside plants, because the utility itself wanted to provide power to the
municipality.41 And in MCI v. AT&T, the pre-breakup Bell System refused to
permit MCI to connect its long distance calls to the Bell System’s local phone
exchanges.42 In each of these cases, the defendant owned a facility that could
not feasibly be duplicated, and also participated in a competitive downstream
market that required access to the facility. By denying access to the facility,
the defendant either eliminated its downstream competitors or imposed
significant costs on them.43
In MCI, the court set out a four-part test for an essential facilities claim:
1.
2.
3.
4.

control of the essential facility by a monopolist;
a competitor’s inability practically or reasonably to duplicate the
essential facility;
the denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and
the feasibility of providing the facility.44

If such a claim is made out, the defendant will be obligated to provide access
to the facility on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms.
Under this test, the defendant must be a monopolist, and the facility must
be ‘essential’ in the sense that the competitor needs access to it in order to
compete. An essential facility will therefore normally be an input into the
competitive market – some component that must be used in providing the
competitive product or service. The need must be substantial, however –
inconvenience or cost increase resulting from unavailability should not
suffice.45 The court’s test also offers a defense of legitimate business
justification, by permitting the defendant to show that it wasn’t feasible to
provide access to the facility. The ‘reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms’
language also limits the defendant’s obligation in circumstances where
particular plaintiffs cannot afford to pay, aren’t willing to pay a reasonable
price, or the like.46
While the court doesn’t discuss it directly, it seems important to add that
withholding an essential facility is illegal only if it has the effect of
foreclosing competition in the downstream market, and therefore of helping
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the defendant to acquire or maintain a monopoly in that market. Otter Tail
and MCI both had such a characteristic; arguably so did Aspen.47 In the
absence of such a market effect, condemning a truly unilateral refusal to deal
could open the door to all sorts of claims in which competition is not really at
stake.
The essential facilities doctrine as a whole has come in for serious
criticism. In its most recent treatment of the issue, the Supreme Court
engaged in a bit of revisionist history, distancing itself from the doctrine and
claiming that the Court had ‘never recognized such a doctrine’.48 Many
prominent antitrust scholars have argued that the doctrine should be abolished
outright.49 Others who favor the continued existence of the doctrine
nonetheless concede that it is properly applied only in rare cases.50
2. Intellectual property itself as essential facility
Regardless of the merits of the essential facilities doctrine in general, its
application to intellectual property cases is particularly problematic.
Generally speaking an intellectual property owner has the right unilaterally to
decide not to use or license its intellectual property. Imposing a duty to deal
in some cases threatens to undermine this basic principle. As a result, we are
aware of no case in which a US court has held that an intellectual property
right was itself an essential facility that must be licensed on reasonable and
nondiscriminatory terms.51
Two recent cases involve claims that intellectual property rights are
essential facilities. In Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,52 Intergraph sued Intel
after Intel cut off its supply of microprocessors and proprietary information.
Intergraph, which makes computer workstations using Intel architecture and
Intel microprocessors, had threatened to sue Intel’s customers for violating
Intergraph patents, an act that triggered Intel’s obligation to defend those
customers. In response, Intel threatened to stop supplying Intergraph with
chips or technical assistance unless Intergraph dropped its patent suit. When
Intergraph ultimately sued Intel for patent infringement, it also made a variety
of antitrust claims based on Intel’s efforts to cut off the flow of technology to
Intergraph.53
Among Intergraph’s claims was an essential facilities argument. Intergraph
argued that access to Intel’s chips and technical know-how was vital to its
business, and that Intel should be compelled to license its patents and trade
secrets to Intergraph on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms. The district
court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that Intel’s intellectual
property rights related to its chip architecture was indeed an essential
facility.54
The Federal Circuit reversed.55 On the essential facilities issue, the court
reviewed the doctrine in detail and concluded that an essential facilities claim
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could not be made out unless the owner of the essential facility and the
antitrust plaintiff competed in a market that required access to the facility.
The court noted that the gravamen of an essential facilities claim has always
been an attempt to use control of such a facility to gain an unfair competitive
advantage in a downstream market in which the defendant and the plaintiff
competed.56 Because it held that Intergraph and Intel did not compete at all,
the court concluded that Intergraph could not possibly make out an essential
facilities claim.57
In Aldridge v. Microsoft Corp.,58 the plaintiff was the seller of a disk
caching program. When Microsoft preempted the plaintiff’s market by
including a competing disk caching function in the new version of its
computer operating system, Aldridge sued, claiming that Microsoft had
violated the antitrust laws. Aldridge argued that Windows 95 was an essential
facility because if a program didn’t run on Windows 95, it was effectively
unavailable to the overwhelming majority of users.59 Aldridge argued that its
disk caching program, which had run on previous Microsoft operating
systems, was disabled on Windows 95, and that as a result it was denied
access to the facility by Microsoft, a company itself entering the disk caching
business. The court restated the four-part test discussed in MCI, adding the
requirement that ‘the defendant has the type of control over the facility that is
forbidden by the Sherman Act.’60 The court held that Aldridge failed to meet
several elements of the test. First, it held that the facility in question was not
essential, a conclusion we discuss below. Second, it noted that the essential
facilities doctrine has only been applied in cases where there is either a
natural monopoly or a government-supported one.61 Microsoft’s operating
system was neither.62
In both Intergraph and Aldridge, the plaintiff’s claims seemed to founder
primarily on the fact that they were seeking to continue privileged access that
they had received in the past, not a level of access that could be provided to
everyone. Thus, while the continuation of this access was ‘essential’ to the
plaintiff’s business model in both cases, it did not qualify as an essential
facility under the antitrust laws. As the court in Aldridge put it, ‘a facility is
essential under the antitrust laws only when it is vital to both the plaintiff’s
individual competitive viability and the viability of the market in general.’63
The court rejected the idea that even monopolists must pre-disclose
information about their own products so that others can build compatible
products.64
In neither case did the court expressly hold that a facility protected by
intellectual property rights could never be essential. In Intergraph, the
Federal Circuit didn’t focus on the intellectual property aspects of the case at
all, even though Intel’s provision of information included both its patented
architecture and trade secrets. Aldridge doesn’t discuss the issue directly, but
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does focus on the problem of innovation. In that case, Microsoft’s exclusion
of Aldridge’s disk caching program occurred when Microsoft solved
problems in its previous operating systems that Aldridge had been correcting.
The court warned against punishing Microsoft for improving its product:
‘Such a result would inhibit, not promote, competition in the market. The
antitrust laws do not require a competitor to maintain archaic or outdated
technology; even monopolists may improve their products.’65 Similarly, in
rejecting Aldridge’s pre-disclosure argument, the court noted that Microsoft
‘could lawfully decline to reveal advances in technology.’66 While neither
passage speaks to intellectual property rights directly, the court clearly seems
concerned to preserve monopolists’ incentives to innovate.
One decision suggesting that intellectual property may constitute an
essential facility is the district court’s decision in BellSouth Advertising v.
Donnelley Information.67 In that case, BellSouth sued Donnelley for
copyright infringement after Donnelley copied the organization of its
telephone ‘yellow pages’. Donnelley counterclaimed on the grounds that the
Bell yellow pages were an essential facility to which it was entitled to access.
The district court found that Donnelley did infringe BellSouth’s copyright.68
Nonetheless, it proceeded to hold that there was a genuine issue of fact for
trial on the question of whether BellSouth’s copyrighted telephone directory
was an essential facility to which it had to provide access. The court
addressed the fact that the ‘facility’ in question was information:
Although the doctrine of essential facilities has been applied predominantly to
tangible assets, there is no reason why it could not apply, as in this case, to
information wrongfully withheld. The effect in both situations is the same: a party
is prevented from sharing something essential to compete.69

The court did not discuss the fact that the directory was copyrighted in the
context of an essential facilities claim. However, since the court had just held
that the directory was copyrighted, it necessarily must have concluded that a
copyrighted work could be an essential facility. Indeed, Aldridge cites
BellSouth for the proposition that the telephone directory can be an essential
facility because it is copyrighted, since copyright law gives BellSouth
effective control over access to the facility.70
While these cases present the issue, none of the courts directly address the
question of whether an intellectual property right itself – or products
protected by an intellectual property right – can constitute an essential
facility. We believe the better view is that an intellectual property right itself
cannot constitute an essential facility, and that the doctrine should not be
applied to cases that seek access to an intellectual property right in any but
the most unusual of circumstances.71
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The essential facilities doctrine itself is a rare and controversial departure
from the general principle that even monopolists do not violate the antitrust
laws unless they engage in anticompetitive conduct that helps them acquire or
maintain a monopoly. The essential facilities doctrine has been successfully
applied primarily in cases in which the facility in question is a natural
monopoly, often regulated, and the owner of that facility uses its monopoly to
suppress competition in a downstream market.72 Intellectual property, as we
have seen, is rarely coextensive with a monopoly at all, much less a regulated
or natural monopoly. Further, to the extent that intellectual property rights
themselves are thought to create the barriers to competition necessary to
make a facility essential, that measure of market control is part and parcel of
the incentives conferred by the intellectual property laws themselves. As the
Supreme Court explained in the context of a telecommunications company,
‘compelling . . . firms to share the source of their advantage is in some
tension with the underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the
incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in . . . economically
beneficial facilities.’73 The risk is even greater where intellectual property
rights are at stake.
There are practical problems with such a requirement as well. Almost
invariably, essential facilities claims involving intellectual property turn out
to be claims demanding a continuation of privileged access to a monopolist’s
technology by a competitor who has built a market in goods or services
complementary to or downstream from that particular technology. Thus,
Intergraph wants continued access to Intel’s proprietary information, and
Aldridge wants pre-release access to Microsoft’s applications program
interfaces.74 To grant such access conflicts directly with the rules of
intellectual property law, which as we have seen permit the intellectual
property owner to refuse to license or use its rights at all.75 It requires the
courts to determine both a reasonable price for the license and fair conditions
for access by others, and to supervise that access on an ongoing basis.76 And
it does so without the normal prerequisite: proof that the intellectual property
owner has sought to expand the scope of the right beyond what the
intellectual property laws permit.
Where an essential facilities claim is premised solely on ownership of an
intellectual property right (the ‘essential’ facility) by a vertically integrated
monopolist, therefore, we believe the purposes of antitrust law are best served
by denying such a claim outright.77 As the court in In re Microsoft Corp.
Antitrust Litigation warned, ‘to require one company to provide its
intellectual property to a competitor would significantly chill innovation’.78
In the next section, we consider some limitations on this general principle.
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3. Intellectual property as incidental to essential facilities claim
Our conclusion in the prior section that intellectual property itself should not
constitute an essential facility does not resolve all of the issues, however.
Obviously, a monopolist can voluntarily agree to license its intellectual
property rights on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms, even though the
law does not compel it to do so. For example, intellectual property owners
that are members of standard-setting organizations often commit to licensing
intellectual property rights covering a standard set by the group to anyone
who wants to use the standard. Once it has agreed to do so, a monopolist is
bound to license its intellectual property right just as any other party would
be. But it is contract rather than antitrust law that compels the company in
this case.
A slightly different case, but one that still falls within the rubric of
voluntary agreements to license, involves nondiscriminatory licensing as a
condition of merger approval. An example is the license imposed by consent
decree in In re Silicon Graphics, Inc.79 The Federal Trade Commission
challenged Silicon Graphics’ purchase of software makers Alias and
Wavefront, arguing that it constituted both horizontal integration (Alias and
Wavefront were competitors) and vertical integration with Silicon Graphics,
the largest maker of workstations running entertainment graphics software.
The Commission entered into a consent decree with Silicon Graphics that
compelled SGI to license the Alias and Wavefront software to all comers on
nondiscriminatory terms.80 While Silicon Graphics was ‘compelled’ in some
sense to license its intellectual property rights, the FTC’s action doesn’t raise
essential facility concerns. So long as the FTC had legitimate grounds to
challenge the merger for other antitrust reasons, it was free to settle its
challenge by imposing reasonable conditions to which Silicon Graphics
agreed.81
A third set of cases that should escape the rule of per se legality we
suggested above has to do with the proper scope of the intellectual property
right in question. The analysis in the preceding section presumes both that the
intellectual property right in question is valid, and that what a plaintiff seeks
to compel is in fact within the legitimate scope of the intellectual property
right. If that is not the case, the intellectual property owner deserves no
special protection from the normal operation of the essential facilities
doctrine. Certainly an invalid intellectual property right should offer no
immunity, though it is also hard to imagine a set of circumstances in which
access to such a right would have to be compelled. A more plausible situation
involves an antitrust claim of access to information that intellectual property
law does not protect – the ideas in a copyrighted work, for example.82 In such
a case, the essential facilities claim should be approached as if the intellectual
property right didn’t exist – that is, intellectual property will not confer any
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immunity, but a plaintiff must still prove all the elements necessary for an
essential facilities claim. Thus, we would disagree with those courts that have
found a legitimate business justification in the prevention of ‘free riding’ on
the defendant’s information in the absence of any intellectual property right
in that information.83 In the absence of intellectual property protection, ‘free
riding’ on facts and ideas is affirmatively encouraged by intellectual property
law. A desire to mimic intellectual property protection where the law has
provided none should not translate into a defense to an otherwise proper
antitrust claim.
The most difficult conceptual issue concerns intellectual property rights
that are incidental to a facility that would be essential even without such a
right. This issue is most likely to arise in the context of a regulated or natural
monopoly. For example, the 7th Circuit in MCI v. AT&T held that the local
lines in the old Bell phone system were an essential facility that Bell had to
provide to those who competed with it in the market for long-distance
telephone services.84 Assuming that this conclusion is right as a matter of
antitrust law, should the outcome have been different if Bell could point to
patents on its telephone switches?
Courts dealing with such situations have generally not paid much if any
attention to the incidental effect of the essential facilities claim on intellectual
property rights. One example is Associated Press v. United States.85 The
Associated Press is a joint venture between different newspapers to pool news
reporting services and stories. The government brought suit, alleging that
AP’s policy permitting an existing member to ‘blacklist’ a proposed new
member (usually a local competitor) violated the antitrust laws. The court
held that the policy was an unreasonable agreement among horizontal
competitors. While the case is not strictly speaking an essential facilities case,
it has certain overtones of compelled access on reasonable terms.86 The Court
made no mention of the fact that AP’s members’ stories were copyrighted,
and that the effect of the decision was to force AP to share those copyrighted
works with others admitted to the joint venture. The court’s focus was on
access to the network itself and the discriminatory effect of AP’s policy.
While copyright was lurking in the background, the copyrighted stories
themselves were not the essential facility to which the complainants wanted
access.87
On this basis, it seems fair to characterize the law as distinguishing
between cases in which the intellectual property right itself is the facility to
which the plaintiff wants access and cases in which intellectual property
rights exist but are incidental to the control of the facility itself. Only in the
former case is the per se rule appropriate. Thus, in MCI, MCI presumably
wanted access to the local telephone distribution lines that ran into each
consumer’s home. They were not interested in AT&T’s switches in
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particular, and certainly not in the fact that certain parts of those switches
may have been patented. Courts do not seem inclined to allow proof of such
an incidental patent right to preclude an essential facilities claim altogether.88
One final point is appropriate. Even where the essential facilities doctrine
does not compel access to a facility protected by an intellectual property
right, Congress may require such access by means of other regulation. The
most important example is the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The
Telecommunications Act displaces earlier essential facility cases against
incumbent telephone companies to the extent that that statute imposes
interconnection as a statutory requirement independent of the antitrust
requirement. As one court put it,
the 1996 Act imposes duties on the ILECs that are not found in the antitrust laws.
Those duties do not conflict with the antitrust laws either; they are simply more
specific and far-reaching obligations that Congress believed would accelerate the
development of competitive markets, consistently with universal service (which,
we note, competitive markets would not necessarily assure).89

Thus, the interconnection requirements of the Telecommunications Act are
independent of the essential facilities doctrine. They do not give rise to an
antitrust cause of action,90 but neither are they subject to the limited
protection for intellectual property rights we describe in the previous
section.91 In Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko,92
the Supreme Court held that the regulatory scheme of the
Telecommunications Act did not directly preempt antitrust authority. At the
same time, the Court reversed the application of the essential facilities
doctrine in that case, noting that an essential facilities claim could not be
made out where a regulatory statute already compelled access to the facility.
D.

Refusal to License as Facilitation of Monopolization93

An alternative claim sometimes made with respect to unilateral refusals to
deal is that the refusal to deal is anticompetitive conduct sufficient to support
a monopoly acquisition or maintenance claim under Section 2. In one sense
such a claim is narrower than an essential facilities theory. The plaintiff must
prove that a specific act – usually refusing to deal with the plaintiff –
constitutes anticompetitive conduct by a monopolist that contributes to
monopolization. The remedy may be limited to the specific conduct, and
therefore may be less sweeping than a general obligation to license all
comers. Still, the line between the essential facilities doctrine – a law
compelling dealing on reasonable and nondiscriminatory terms – and a
unilateral refusal to license claim – challenging a refusal to deal on
reasonable terms – is a fine one. It is somewhat surprising that courts have
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treated unilateral refusals to license differently, and somewhat more harshly,
than they have treated essential facilities claims.
Even so, antitrust decisions are skeptical of claims that involve unilateral
refusals to deal. As we have seen,94 a party generally has the unilateral right
to refuse to deal with whomever it chooses, for commercial reasons, for
social or personal reasons, or for no reason at all.95 Only where a refusal to
deal extends, preserves, creates, or threatens to create significant market
power is it subject to scrutiny under Section 2 at all. And even there, a
violation of Section 2 requires a court to find that the refusal to deal is itself
‘anticompetitive conduct’ rather than a permissible exercise of corporate
discretion. Courts have rarely done this, primarily in situations where the
refusal cuts off a preexisting, profitable business relationship96 or where the
refusal is conditional rather than unilateral.97
Where the refusal to deal involves intellectual property rights, courts are
even less willing to condemn it. As we have seen,98 the intellectual property
rights necessarily embody the power to exclude others from the use of the
right. For antitrust law to interfere with that right, there must be clear
evidence that the exercise of the right facilitates monopolization that extends
beyond the scope of the intellectual property right itself.99 Whether and how
an antitrust plaintiff can make such a showing has been the subject of much
recent controversy in the courts. Different circuits have taken three different
approaches, which we detail in the sections below.
1. Per se legality (Federal Circuit approach)
The Federal Circuit dealt with the legality of unilateral refusals to license
patent rights in two cases at the tail end of the Twentieth Century. The two
decisions are somewhat at odds in their holdings. The first case is Intergraph
v. Intel,100 discussed above for its holding regarding essential facilities.101
Intergraph also alleged that Intel’s failure to continue to supply it with access
to proprietary information, chips, and technical support constituted a refusal
to deal that violated Section 2. The court seemed to take the approach
discussed above for non-intellectual property cases. It began by observing
that
it is well established that in the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a
monopoly, the Sherman act does not restrict the long-recognized right of a trader or
manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.102

The court acknowledged that refusals to deal ‘may raise antitrust concerns
when the refusal is directed against competition and the purpose is to create,
maintain, or enlarge a monopoly.’103 Nonetheless, it found no Section 2
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violation based on Intel’s refusal to deal, both because it concluded that Intel
and Intergraph did not compete at all, and because it saw the fact that
Intergraph had sued Intel as a valid reason for Intel to cease giving Intergraph
preferential treatment.104
Only three months later, the Federal Circuit took a very different approach
to unilateral refusals to license intellectual property in In re Independent
Service Organizations Antitrust Litigation.105 In that case, a group of
independent service organizations (ISOs) that provided service for Xerox
copiers sued Xerox for violating the antitrust laws because Xerox refused to
sell parts to them or their customers. Xerox designed its policy so that it sold
parts only to end-users that serviced the machines themselves, or to end-users
who hired Xerox to perform service. The effect of the Xerox policy was to
drive the ISOs out of the business of servicing Xerox copiers, and to reserve
that business exclusively to Xerox.
Xerox counterclaimed for patent and copyright infringement, arguing that
it had patents on a number of its parts and copyrights on its service drawings
that the ISOs had infringed. Xerox also argued that it could not be held liable
for violating the antitrust laws if all it did was unilaterally refuse to sell
patented or copyrighted products to the ISOs, regardless of the purpose or
effect of that refusal.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Xerox. The court asserted that there was
‘no reported case in which a court has imposed antitrust liability for a
unilateral refusal to sell or license a patent.’106 The court held that a
patentee’s right to refuse to license its intellectual property right was limited
only in certain circumstances: where the patent was obtained through fraud,
where a lawsuit to enforce the patent was a sham, or where the patent holder
uses his ‘statutory right to refuse to sell patented parts to gain a monopoly in
a market beyond the scope of the patent.’107
In the case before it, the court held that Xerox had not sought to extend its
patents beyond the scope of the statutory grant. It noted that patents
themselves could cover more than one market, and it held without
explanation that Xerox’s parts patents entitled it to control the market for
service of Xerox copiers as well.108 And it refused to inquire into Xerox’s
motivation for refusing to license its parts patents.109 Thus, the Federal
Circuit created a per se rule of legality, in accord with earlier statements from
both the Second and Sixth Circuits.110
The Xerox court also considered Xerox’s refusal to license its copyrights.
In doing so, it applied Tenth Circuit law. In the absence of any precedent
from the Tenth Circuit, the court adopted the First Circuit’s approach in Data
General, and rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach in Image Technical.111 We
discuss both approaches immediately below.
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2. Rebuttable presumption (First Circuit approach)
In Data General v. Grumman Systems Support,112 the First Circuit confronted
an aftermarket exclusion claim similar in some respects to Xerox. In Data
General, though, the ISOs were repairing computer hardware, and the ‘part’
they needed access to was Data General’s copyrighted diagnostic software.
As in Xerox, Data General cut off access to the software in an effort to
increase its own share of the service of its computers. When the ISOs
obtained access to the software without permission, Data General sued for
copyright infringement, and Grumman counterclaimed for violations of the
antitrust laws. The district court rejected Grumman’s antitrust claims on
summary judgment.
The court engaged in what it described as ‘an exhaustive inquiry’ into the
relationship between copyright and the antitrust laws.113 The court sought to
read the two statutes in light of each other, rather than giving primacy to one
over the other. In particular, it refused to adopt Data General’s proposed
irrebuttable presumption that a unilateral refusal to license a copyright was
legal. Instead, the court held that it must inquire into whether a refusal to
license could support a claim for monopolization.114 Nonetheless, it created a
presumption designed to take the copyrights into account: ‘[W]hile
exclusionary conduct can include a monopolist’s unilateral refusal to license
a copyright, an author’s desire to exclude others from use of its copyrighted
work is a presumptively valid business justification for any immediate harm
to consumers’.115
Applying this presumption, the court held that summary judgment for Data
General was appropriate. While there might be a genuine issue of fact as to
harm to consumers, the court concluded, there was no evidence to rebut the
presumption in this case. Data General’s old policy of permitting ISO
competition had never led to a competitive market, so the withdrawal of its
support couldn’t be proof of anticompetitive effect. The copyrights were
valid, the copyrighted diagnostic software was innovative, and the court was
unwilling to inquire into Data General’s motivation in enforcing the
copyrights.116
Thus, the First Circuit refused to apply a per se rule, settling instead for a
strong presumption that even a monopolist acts lawfully by refusing to
license its copyright. Xerox endorsed this rebuttable presumption in copyright
(as opposed to patent) cases, saying it is ‘consistent with both the antitrust
and the copyright laws’.117
3. The role of intent (Ninth Circuit approach)
The Ninth Circuit has taken a third approach in a case with facts strikingly
similar to Xerox, and indeed one that arose in the same industry. Image
Technical Services v. Eastman Kodak118 also involved an antitrust claim by
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ISOs in the photocopier industry who had been cut off after years of
coexistence, in this case by Kodak. Unlike Xerox, however, Kodak did not
counterclaim for patent or copyright infringement. The case was litigated for
almost ten years, including one trip to the US Supreme Court,119 before
Kodak on remand asserted as a defense that some of its parts were covered by
patents and its service software was covered by copyrights.
The Ninth Circuit upheld a jury finding of antitrust liability.120 It found
that Kodak had power in the market for service of Kodak copiers, and that
Kodak had engaged in anticompetitive conduct by refusing to sell parts to
ISOs, or to end users who dealt with ISOs. The court then proceeded to
consider whether Kodak could offer a legitimate business justification for its
conduct. The court recognized that while intellectual property owners are not
immune from antitrust liability, ‘patent and copyright holders may refuse to
sell or license protected work’121 and that no prior case imposed antitrust
liability on the basis of a unilateral refusal to license.122 The court pointed
out, however, that other sorts of conduct, such as concerted acts under
Section 1 or extension of a patent beyond the lawful scope of its grant, could
violate the antitrust laws.123
With respect to unilateral refusals to license intellectual property, the
Ninth Circuit endorsed the rebuttable presumption adopted in the Data
General case.124 Nonetheless, the court refused to give Kodak the benefit of
the presumption because it found the presumption had been rebutted.125
Specifically, the court pointed to two pieces of evidence. The first was the
fact that Kodak had thousands of parts, but that only 65 of those parts were
patented. The second factor was one that the Data General court specifically
rejected: the fact that Kodak’s intellectual property justifications were
pretextual and adopted only long after the fact.126 The court defended the role
of intent in the analysis, saying that ‘neither the aims of intellectual property
law, or the antitrust laws justify allowing a monopolist to rely upon a
pretextual business justification to mask anticompetitive conduct.’127
The court sought to cabin the likely effect of its holding. It noted that
‘some weight [must] be given to the intellectual property rights of the
monopolist’, and expressed ‘serious concern’ about the effect of claims like
the one it permitted on the value of intellectual property rights.128
Nonetheless, Image Technical adopts a modified form of the Data General
presumption, both one that applies to patents as well as copyrights and one
that allows evidence of the defendant’s intent in adopting its policy to
overcome the presumption that a refusal to license is legitimate.
4. Reconciling these approaches
On their face, the opinions in Xerox, Data General and Image Technical
present a rather stark conflict. Despite strikingly similar facts, the courts not
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only reach different results but take fundamentally different approaches to
reconciling antitrust and intellectual property law.129 In this section, we
suggest some ways that these approaches might be reconciled. In the absence
of such a reconciliation, however, the issue is ripe for review by the Supreme
Court.130
a. Distinguishing legitimate refusals to license from post hoc justifications.
One way to reconcile the Image Technical, Xerox and Data General
decisions may be to focus on the facts of each of the cases. While in one
sense the three decisions involved very similar facts – indeed, Image
Technical and Xerox arose in the same industry – the way in which the
unilateral refusal issue came to the court was very different. In Xerox, the
antitrust claim by the ISOs was met immediately by a counterclaim for patent
and copyright infringement.131 By contrast, in Image Technical patents were
not even an issue until many years into the litigation. Even then, Kodak never
alleged infringement of its intellectual property rights, but merely asserted
that the fact that it owned patents covering some of its parts immunized it
from antitrust liability.
This difference in facts offers the most plausible way to understand the
Ninth Circuit’s much-criticized discussion of ‘intent’. As noted above, the
Ninth Circuit did in fact adopt the Data General presumption that a refusal to
license intellectual property rights was a legitimate business decision.132 It
departed from the First Circuit approach only in permitting evidence of the
antitrust defendant’s intent to rebut the presumption. A narrow reading of the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion – and indeed we think the reading the court most
likely intended – would not open the door to evidence of intent to injure
competition. Rather, it would merely permit the antitrust plaintiff to
demonstrate that there was no legitimate refusal to license intellectual
property rights at stake, and that the invocation of intellectual property rights
was a ‘pretext’ – a post hoc justification for conduct that had nothing to do
with intellectual property. Read in this light, Image Technical would not open
the door to evidence of a defendant’s intent except in very specialized
circumstances. While the evidentiary disputes engendered by Image
Technical’s focus on statements of intent will likely be substantial, this
reading helps to cabin them somewhat.
We should note, however, that this understanding of Image Technical
doesn’t necessarily justify the court’s result. At most, proof of such a pretext
could strip Kodak of any special immunity its intellectual property rights
might have conferred on it. But even owners of unpatented parts have a
general right unilaterally to refuse to deal with particular customers.133 Thus,
the court’s pretext finding merely permits it to reject one possible business
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justification relating to intellectual property; it says nothing about how other,
non-intellectual-property-related justifications might fare.
It is also worth noting that none of the three cases were truly unilateral
refusals to license in the pure sense. In each case, what was really at issue
was a tying arrangement in which customers could get parts only if they also
bought service. Because all of the cases were ultimately litigated on grounds
of monopolization rather than tying,134 the courts approached them as
unilateral refusals to license. But the rather unusual factual hybrid may
account for differences in the cases. Xerox expressly recognized that tying
arrangements involving patents could be illegal;135 it simply didn’t apply that
rule to the conditional agreement at issue in the case before it. By contrast,
while Image Technical did not apply the rules of tying, it was clearly
concerned that Kodak was using its intellectual property rights as a cover for
what was in effect a tying arrangement. It may be, therefore, that the courts
simply focused on different aspects of the cases before them, and that were
the Federal Circuit to consider a pure tie – or the Ninth Circuit to consider a
pure refusal to license – they would reach results in accord with their sister
circuits.
b. Presumptions and risks of error. Even once these factual differences are
taken into account, the three circuits take different approaches to the problem
of unilateral refusals to license. While all three circuits are willing to presume
that an intellectual property owner has the power to refuse to license or use its
rights, only the Federal Circuit has made that presumption irrebuttable, and
then only for patents.136 Both the First and Ninth Circuits are willing to
permit some sorts of evidence to rebut the presumption of legitimacy. They
disagree, however, about what kinds of evidence are acceptable.
This disagreement over the right presumption is fundamentally about the
costs of various sorts of error. An irrebuttable presumption of legality, like
per se rules of illegality, establishes relatively clear rules for behavior. It may
be applied to reach problematic results in some cases, however. By contrast,
rebuttable presumptions offer somewhat less predictability, but permit courts
to delve into the factual context of the cases before them in order to
determine competitive effect. In deciding which rule is appropriate, therefore,
courts must consider three factors: the risk of erroneously condemning
procompetitive conduct, the risk of erroneously permitting anticompetitive
conduct, and the administrative and uncertainty costs associated with a more
flexible standard.137
An irrebuttable presumption may be appropriate given these factors, but
only within narrow confines. Where the core right of exclusion is at stake,
prohibiting enforcement of an intellectual property right will likely impose
significant uncertainty costs on all intellectual property owners. Further,
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while there may be anticompetitive effects from a unilateral refusal to license
a valid intellectual property right, those effects are a natural consequence of
the intellectual property laws themselves, not the defendant’s conduct. By
contrast, where the refusal to license is not truly unilateral, where it is
conditioned in an effort to expand the scope of the intellectual property right,
or where it covers rights not granted by the intellectual property laws, the
irrebuttable presumption should not apply. Indeed, it is not clear that any
presumption of legality is appropriate in these sorts of cases.
Thus, while we agree in principle with the legal rule established in Xerox,
we believe it will be applicable only in a very narrow set of cases. Indeed, as
noted above, it is not clear that Xerox itself was truly a case involving an
unconditioned, unilateral refusal to license. In the sections that follow, we
discuss some issues relating to the proper scope of any such presumption.138
E.

Duty to Continue Dealing

Courts are sometimes willing to impose antitrust duties on monopolists to
continue existing relationships in circumstances in which they would not be
required to enter into new relationships. A notable example is Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.139 In that case, Highlands and Ski Co.
operated competing ski mountains in Aspen, Colorado. There are four
mountains in Aspen; while they were originally individually owned, at the
time of litigation Ski Co. had purchased three of the four. The four mountains
had a long-standing joint lift ticket arrangement, under which a skier could
buy one multi-day ticket good for any mountain. When Ski Co. terminated
the arrangement, Highlands sued, arguing that Ski Co. was trying to drive it
out of business. The jury found that Ski Co. had acted anticompetitively by
ending the arrangement, and that the effect was to enable it to monopolize the
market. The Supreme Court affirmed. It refused to decide whether the joint
lift ticket was an essential facility, instead concluding that Ski Co.’s failure to
continue a profitable existing business relationship without a legitimate
justification itself violated Section 2.140 The Court did not hold that a
monopolist had a duty to deal with its rivals, though it noted that a refusal to
deal ‘may have evidentiary significance’.141 The Court focused significant
attention, though, on Ski Co.’s refusal to continue a profitable existing
business relationship with Highlands. It noted that the joint lift ticket
provided benefits to both sides, and that there were no plausible changes in
factual circumstances to render the joint lift ticket unprofitable to Ski Co. It
found sufficient evidence ‘that Ski Company was not motivated by efficiency
concerns and that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer
goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival’.142
This in turn was sufficient to violate Section 2.
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Aspen may well be sui generis.143 Indeed, the Supreme Court has described
it as existing ‘at or near the outer boundary of §2 liability.’144 But to the
extent it establishes a general principle of law, that principle seems to be that
terminating an existing business relationship without a legitimate efficiencyrelated reason may violate the antitrust laws even where a monopolist would
be under no obligation to enter into a new relationship along the same
lines.145 The Supreme Court’s decision in Kodak v. Image Technical
Services146 seemed to give further support to the idea that terminating existing
relationships can be problematic.
Neither case involved intellectual property, at least as presented to the
Supreme Court.147 The question for our purposes is whether Aspen and Kodak
might be read to compel an intellectual property owner to continue an
existing license arrangement, even though the same owner would not be
obligated to enter into a new license arrangement. Notwithstanding Aspen, we
think the answer must be no.
In the first place, Xerox, Data General, and Image Technical all involved
refusals to continue an existing business relationship. Despite this fact, the
courts in Xerox and Data General found no antitrust violation. While the
court did find a violation in Image Technical, it did not focus on the
continuing nature of the relationship, but rather on the fact that intellectual
property rights were raised only as a pretext. Xerox did not consider the
continuing nature of the relationship relevant at all. Only Data General
suggested it might be relevant in the intellectual property context. The court
there refused to apply Aspen only ‘because we are unable to view DG’s
market practices in both competitive and noncompetitive condition’, and so
unable to infer that Data General’s change of heart occurred because it was
now a monopolist.148 The courts to consider the issue have not generally
treated the existence of a prior relationship as particularly important.
We think that there are reasons to be particularly wary of reading Aspen to
compel continued dealing in the intellectual property context. Intellectual
property licenses are generally quite complex, and they often involve
technologies and markets that change rapidly. Locking companies into
existing business relationships seems particularly inappropriate in fastchanging markets. Intellectual property licenses are often exclusive, in whole
or in part; locking in relationships in such a context may prevent competition
by other potential licensees down the road. Further, as a general matter
antitrust law wants to encourage the licensing of intellectual property, since
the alternative may be monopoly or at least more centralized control over
production.149 Forcing companies to continue an existing license relationship
may have the perverse effect of discouraging them from licensing their
intellectual property rights in the first place. In short, we think it would be a
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mistake to depart from the presumptions that protect unilateral refusals to
license merely because the parties had had a relationship in the past.
F.

Determining the Scope of Intellectual Property Rights150

It should be clear that any presumption of legality based on a unilateral
refusal to license intellectual property rights extends only so far as those
rights themselves do. As an initial matter, therefore, efforts to enforce or
refusals to license clearly invalid intellectual property rights, or efforts to
enforce valid intellectual property rights against conduct that clearly does not
infringe, must be outside the protection of the presumption.151 Xerox and
Data General both explicitly acknowledge that antitrust claims can be based
on sham litigation or Walker Process allegations without interfering with the
proper scope of the intellectual property laws.
The point is more general, however. The protection of the intellectual
property laws should extend only as far as those laws themselves extend. A
refusal to license will be presumed legitimate if the conduct for which a
license is withheld is in fact within the scope of an intellectual property right.
But the presumption should not extend to protect refusals to license that go
beyond the scope of the intellectual property rights themselves.152 That
doesn’t mean that the refusal to provide, say, uncopyrighted information is
illegal, of course. As with any other unilateral refusal to deal outside the
intellectual property context, it will normally be legal. Rather, the point is
merely that the Xerox-Data General presumption cannot protect conduct that
is itself outside the scope of an intellectual property right.
United States v. Microsoft is an example.153 Among the government’s
allegations of anticompetitive conduct in that case were challenges to
Microsoft’s refusal to permit computer hardware manufacturers to introduce
their own boot-up screen or to modify the appearance of the Windows
desktop in any way, notably by removing the Internet explorer icon. In the
pretrial proceedings,154 Microsoft moved for summary judgment, arguing that
because Windows was copyrighted, it could not violate the antitrust laws by
refusing to let people alter the program. Microsoft claimed that its license
restrictions on hardware manufacturers ‘merely highlight and expressly state
the rights that Microsoft already enjoys under federal copyright law’. The
district court rejected this argument on summary judgment. It held:
Microsoft argues that it ‘may refrain from vending or licensing and content [itself]
with simply exercising the right to exclude others from using [its intellectual]
property.’ See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123, 127, 52 S.Ct. 546, 76 L.Ed.
1010 (1932). But whatever copyright protection Microsoft enjoys in its software is
not unlimited. For example, copyright in a computer program does not extend to its
functional aspects. See, e.g., Lotus Dev. Corp. v. Borland Int’l, Inc., 49 F.3d 807
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(1st Cir.1995), aff’d by an equally divided Court, 516 U.S. 233, 116 S.Ct. 804, 133
L.Ed.2d 610 (1996). It does not preclude design choices dictated by necessity, cost,
convenience or consumer demand. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft
Corp., 35 F.3d 1435, 1442 (9th Cir.1994) (user interface of computer program
entitled to only limited protection against ‘virtually identical’ copying, because of
license and because of limited number of different ways the underlying idea can be
expressed); Computer Assocs. Int’l v. Altai, 982 F.2d 693, 715 (2d Cir.1992)
(significant portions of structure, sequence, and organization of program may be
copied in order to write similar program to run on different platform). And it does
not render inviolate portions of the program that are not original to its creator.
Furthermore, copyright law does not give Microsoft blanket authority to license
(or refuse to license) its intellectual property as it sees fit. A copyright does not
give its holder immunity from laws of general applicability, including the antitrust
laws. Copyright holders are restricted in their ability to extend their control to other
markets. They may not prevent the development and use of interoperable programs
by competitors. Antitrust liability may also attach to other anticompetitive
licensing restrictions involving copyrighted works.155

The court didn’t deny that Microsoft owned a valid copyright in its Windows
operating system. But it noted that ownership of an intellectual property right
does not give the owner carte blanche over all uses of the intellectual
property. In particular, the court found that Microsoft failed to demonstrate
that the hardware manufacturers would be violating its copyrights if they
made the prohibited alterations to the start-up and home screens. The court
rejected Microsoft’s argument that it had a moral right of integrity in its
software, and held that ‘the extent of copyright protection in the specific
portions of the software plaintiffs seek to modify’ presented a disputed issue
of fact.
After trial, the court found that ‘Microsoft has presented no evidence that
the contractual (or the technological) restrictions it placed on OEMs’ ability
to alter Windows derive from any of the enumerated rights explicitly granted
to a copyright holder under the Copyright Act’.156 As a result, it could not
benefit from the presumption of legitimacy, however articulated, that attends
refusals to license intellectual property rights. Microsoft hadn’t simply
exercised its copyright rights; it had sought to impose on hardware
manufacturers a restriction that copyright law did not support.157
Assuming the court was right as a matter of copyright law to conclude that
the minor modifications in question didn’t constitute derivative works, its
antitrust conclusion seems correct as well. A presumption of legitimacy in
refusing to license an intellectual property right – and certainly an irrebuttable
presumption of the sort Xerox adopts for patents cases – is appropriate only
where there is in fact a refusal to license an intellectual property right. Where
the intellectual property owner seeks to expand by contract the scope of rights
allocated to it, a very different issue is presented.158 Whether or not patent
and copyright law permit such contractual expansions, the contracts are
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surely not immune from antitrust liability. Indeed, such licensing restrictions
are the primary source of antitrust violations involving intellectual property.
A prerequisite to applying the Xerox or Data General presumption,
therefore, is proof not only that the defendant owns a valid intellectual
property right, but that the use the plaintiff proposes would in fact infringe
that right. This is more likely to be an issue in copyright than patent law,
because copyright contains many more restrictions on the scope of the right.
Copyright protection doesn’t extend to ideas, facts, functional elements,
scenes a faire, or unoriginal portions of a work.159 It covers only duplication,
adaptation, distribution, and public performance and display, not all uses that
might be made of a work.160 And it is subject to numerous exceptions and
defenses, including not only the fair use doctrine161 but also a complex series
of compulsory licensing schemes.162 The latter are particularly important; it
would obviously be anomalous to conclude that copyright law protected a
refusal to license in circumstances in which copyright law itself required
licensing on defined terms.
While the rights granted a patentee are much stronger – including the right
to control any making, using, selling, offering for sale, or importing of the
patented invention163 – they too are not unlimited. Patent law restricts a
patentee’s control through the exhaustion doctrine,164 through the reverse
doctrine of equivalents,165 and most importantly through limitations tied to
the scope of the patent claims. It is not enough to assert ownership of a patent
right that covers a product in a general sense; for a refusal to license to be
protected by the Xerox presumption, the patent must be infringed by the
proposed use.166
G. Distinguishing Antitrust Violations from the Scope of Antitrust
Remedies
A second limitation on the scope of the Xerox and Data General
presumptions concerns the distinction between antitrust violations and
antitrust remedies. In this chapter we have discussed whether a unilateral
refusal to license an intellectual property right can violate the antitrust laws,
either on its own (under some sort of essential facilities doctrine) or as
anticompetitive conduct sufficient to support a Section 2 claim when coupled
with proof of monopoly power and causation. Except in the most unusual
circumstances, a pure unilateral refusal to license cannot support such a
claim.
A different set of issues is presented by judicial efforts to compel licensing
of an intellectual property right as a remedy for other sorts of antitrust
violations. Compulsory licensing has a long history as an antitrust remedy,167
and may be quite appropriate depending on the nature of the antitrust
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violation itself. So long as the refusal to license is not a part of the finding of
violation, compelled licensing as an antitrust remedy doesn’t run afoul of the
presumption we have discussed in this section.168 Compelling licensing of
intellectual property rights as an antitrust remedy does present a variety of
other issues, of course, which are beyond the scope of this chapter.169

IV.

DISTINGUISHING UNILATERAL FROM
CONDITIONAL OR CONCERTED REFUSALS

This chapter treats unilateral refusals to license intellectual property rights,
not concerted and conditional refusals to deal. Nonetheless, because of the
very different rules applied to unilateral refusals to license, defining what is –
and what isn’t – a ‘unilateral’ refusal becomes quite important. In this
section we distinguish true unilateral refusals to license both from concerted
action and from ‘conditional’ refusals.
A.

Concerted Refusals to Deal

Antitrust law draws a fundamental distinction between unilateral and
concerted action. Unilateral conduct is generally dealt with under Section 2 of
the Sherman Act. By contrast, Section 1 of the Sherman Act separately
prohibits unreasonable agreements in restraint of trade. The Section 1
prohibitions on conduct are, generally speaking, stricter than the Section 2
rules. The law will condemn certain combinations among competitors per se,
and even where the per se rule does not apply Section 1 does not always
require a showing of market power for illegality.170
This fundamental distinction plays an historic role in intellectual property
cases as well. Courts have distinguished between an intellectual property
owner’s exercise of its lawfully granted right and that same owner’s
agreement with others to constrain their pricing or output decisions.
Agreements concerning the disposition of intellectual property rights can be
illegal even when unilateral action is not.171 There are myriad examples;
among the most common types of concerted conduct relating to intellectual
property are tying arrangements, patent pools and cross-licenses, grantback
clauses and field of use restrictions.172
Because of this fundamental distinction, it should be clear that the cases
we have discussed apply only to unilateral and not concerted action by
intellectual property owners. In Xerox, for example, the court expressly
discussed the requirements for monopolization under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act.173 The Xerox court considered only allegations that a patentee’s
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unilateral efforts to ‘enforce the statutory right to exclude others’ violated the
antitrust laws.174 There is nothing in the opinion (or in Data General or
Image Technical)175 to suggest that the court meant its ruling to extend to
situations in which the patentee agreed with another to restrict competition.
The body of law on unilateral refusals to license cannot displace the
voluminous precedent concerning either horizontal or vertical agreements.
B.

Conditional Refusals to Deal

Determining that Xerox and related cases do not apply to concerted action
doesn’t resolve the issue of their scope, however. The line between individual
and concerted acts in antitrust law has historically proven quite malleable.
We must therefore inquire whether the line of cases dealing with ‘unilateral’
refusals to license covers only ‘pure’ unilateral refusals, or whether it ought
to be extended to circumstances in which an intellectual property owner
effectively enters into an agreement imposing conditions on a licensee, but
structures the transaction in such a way that the conditions are unilaterally
announced rather than being part of an express agreement.
1. Relevance of Xerox
Xerox did not hold that unilateral conduct by an intellectual property owner
enforcing a patent right can never be illegal under Section 2. Rather, it
identified three circumstances in which a patent owner could violate
Section 2, and discussed each in some detail. First, a patentee could enforce a
patent obtained by fraud – a so-called Walker Process violation. Second, a
patentee could engage in sham litigation. Both of these exceptions are wellrecognized, and involve a patentee asserting in court a right it does not
legitimately own.176 Finally, the court noted the ‘undisputed premise that the
patent holder cannot use his statutory right to refuse to sell patented parts to
gain a monopoly in a market beyond the scope of the patent.’177 This suggests
that even unilateral conduct may be illegal under Xerox if the effect of that
conduct is to extend the power of an intellectual property right beyond its
lawful scope.
In the course of summarizing the rule it was adopting, however, the Xerox
court chose language much more limiting than in its detailed discussion:
In the absence of any indication of illegal tying, fraud in the Patent and Trademark
Office, or sham litigation, the patent holder may enforce the statutory right to
exclude others from making, using or selling the claimed invention free from
liability under the antitrust laws.178
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It is possible to read this language as foreclosing any antitrust claim not based
on tying, Walker Process fraud, or sham litigation, and indeed one court has
done so. In Townshend v. Rockwell Int’l, the court reasoned that since ‘a
patent owner has the legal right to refuse to license his or her patent on any
terms, the existence of a predicate condition to a license agreement cannot
state an antitrust violation’.179 We do not think the court intended such a
sweeping holding, however.180 In the first place, as noted above, the court’s
more detailed discussion included anticompetitive extension of a patent right,
not just tying, within its ambit. It is likely, therefore, that the court’s later
mention of such cases as ‘tying’ claims was intended to restate rather than to
undo its prior discussion. Second, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
‘power gained through some natural and legal advantage such as a patent [or]
copyright, . . . can give rise to liability if “a seller exploits his dominant
position in one market to expand his empire into the next”.’181 For the Federal
Circuit, to restrict antitrust claims involving valid patents to tying cases
would appear to conflict with the Supreme Court’s most recent
pronouncement on the issue.182 An alternative reading of Xerox would require
the courts to jettison a century of jurisprudence involving the legality of
conditions imposed by intellectual property owners on licensees. Even if a
Federal Circuit panel had the power to make such a sweeping change in the
law, we should not lightly impute to the court a desire to do so. Finally, at
least for exclusive dealing cases, Section 3 of the Clayton Act forecloses such
a reading, since it clearly applies to unilateral conduct involving goods
‘whether patented or unpatented’.183 Exclusive dealing, at least, must
therefore fall outside the Xerox rule.
A more plausible reading of Xerox is that the court intended to encompass
within its new rule of per se legality only conduct within the legitimate scope
of the intellectual property right. Conduct that seeks to expand the scope of
an intellectual property right will not be protected from antitrust liability.
What conduct that includes remains to be fully determined, however. We
consider this issue in the following section.
2. Distinguishing Section 1 and Section 2 cases
In light of the preferential treatment of unilateral refusals to license,
intellectual property owners may be expected to attempt to characterize their
conduct as a unilateral refusal to license. For example, suppose that a patent
owner wishes to tie a license to its patent to the purchase of a staple article of
commerce – say, salt. If the patent owner enters into contracts with licensees
requiring them to buy salt from it, the contract is unquestionably a tying
arrangement, and under traditional antitrust law may well be illegal.184
Suppose instead that the patentee were merely to announce to the world that it
was free to deal with whomever it chose, and that henceforth it would only
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grant licenses to those who ‘voluntarily’ chose to buy salt from the patentee.
Does the change in the form of the restriction – from a contract to a unilateral
announcement – change the legal result?185
Antitrust law has faced a similar characterization problem in trying to
distinguish vertical agreements treated under Section 1 from permissible
unilateral conduct.186 The maker of a product is generally free to decide to
whom it will sell, and to terminate its buyers at will.187 But this right does not
include the right to impose certain types of conditions on those buyers –
notably but not exclusively tying arrangements and resale price restrictions.
The result has been a rather complex line-drawing process, in which courts
permit termination of buyers who don’t adhere to certain conditions but
forbid any sort of negotiation or other effort to convince buyers to comply
with the conditions.188 This body of law can justifiably be criticized as
extremely formalist.
This set of rules has been expressly applied to intellectual property
licenses by the Fourth Circuit in Service & Training Inc. v. Data General.189
That case, like the First Circuit’s decision in Data General, involved Data
General’s decision to stop supplying diagnostic software to independent
service organizations repairing Data General computers for customers. The
plaintiff there alleged that Data General’s refusal to sell them copies of the
diagnostic software, while making the software available to its ultimate
customers who wished to self-service, constituted a de facto tying
arrangement. The court rejected this theory because it found only a unilateral
decision by Data General as to who it wished to do business with:
Appellants’ evidence at bottom shows nothing more than a unilateral decision by
Data General to license MV/ADEX to [end-users] but not to others. The fact that
Data General has selectively licensed MV/ADEX is not evidence of an illegal tying
agreement. Data General may lawfully license MV/ADEX to whomever it
chooses.190

The court made it clear, however, that the plaintiff’s tying theory could have
proceeded had they demonstrated an agreement of some sort between Data
General and its customers. Data General avoided the reach of tying law
because its decision was unilateral – it simply chose to sell its software to
customers but not to competitors.
In applying these rules to intellectual property cases, it is important to keep
in mind several limits on the ability of intellectual property owners to stretch
the Xerox rule to cover conditional conduct. First, notwithstanding the
antitrust advantages of unilateral action, there are a number of powerful
incentives for intellectual property owners to enter into express licensing
agreements. Many intellectual property licenses involve a continuing
relationship between the parties in which not only patent rights but also trade
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secrets and other forms of know-how are exchanged. In such a circumstance,
it is in the interest of both parties to clearly set out the rights and obligations
of each. While it is perhaps possible to imagine writing a ‘unilateral action
policy’ that takes these complexities into account – in which an intellectual
property owner ‘announces’ that they will license only to parties that agree to
a list of conditions – that is surely not the sort of unilateral conduct the Xerox
court had in mind. Where an intellectual property owner seeks to compel
certain types of conduct or obligations from its licensees rather than merely to
distinguish between groups of buyers, the resulting relationship is an
agreement on conditions, not a pure unilateral refusal to license.
Second, many of the conditions intellectual property owners might wish to
impose involve promises by licensees to act or refrain from acting in certain
ways in the future. Grantback clauses, some sorts of ties and reciprocal deals,
confidentiality and noncompetition obligations cannot be monitored ex ante.
In each case, the intellectual property owner is granting a right today in return
for a promise that the licensee will act in a certain way tomorrow. What such
an owner needs is an enforceable right to compel a licensee to act as
promised in the future. That in turn requires an enforceable agreement setting
out the condition, not just the power to decide unilaterally whom to license
today. This is particularly true with respect to certain types of intellectual
property transactions – trade secrets, know-how, access to unprotectable facts
– in which the disclosure of the know-how is irreversible.
Third, the Sherman Act is not the only antitrust statute that might come
into play where a license is conditioned. In particular, Section 3 of the
Clayton Act prohibits the imposition of certain types of conditions – notably
ties and exclusive deals – in transactions in commodities.191
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that even under Xerox an intellectual
property owner’s right to unilaterally refuse to license is not absolute. Xerox
followed Data General in applying only a rebuttable presumption of
legitimacy in copyright as opposed to patent cases. Microsoft is to the same
effect.192 One court has held that Xerox’s irrebuttable presumption does not
apply to trade secrets.193 Further, as noted above, even unilateral refusals to
license patents will not be immune from Section 2 scrutiny if they operate to
expand a patent beyond its lawful scope. Thus, even if a patentee succeeds in
characterizing a conditional refusal to deal (such as a tie) as ‘unilateral’
conduct, the patentee will still face potential liability under the Supreme
Court decision in Eastman Kodak for using the condition to expand the
effective scope of the right.
This is, we think, as it should be. The preferential rules governing
unilateral conduct are designed to protect an intellectual property owner in
the lawful exercise of the rights the law has given it. If the intellectual
property owner seeks more than the intellectual property laws expressly
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permit, it must contend with the limits that antitrust law places on conditional
and concerted conduct.194
C.

Acquisitions of Intellectual Property

The pure case of a unilateral refusal to license must also be distinguished
from cases in which the antitrust claim is based on the acquisition of
intellectual property rights through merger or purchase. Such acquisitions are
treated under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. In SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp.,195
the court distinguished between Xerox’s refusal to license its patents, which it
found to be permissible, and Xerox’s original acquisition of those patents,
which presented a Section 7 issue. A company could violate Section 7 by
accumulating too strong a patent portfolio through acquisition,196 but if the
acquisition of the patents didn’t violate the antitrust laws, the company was
free to enforce those patents just as if it had developed them internally.197
D.

Intel Decisions and Cross-Licensing

Adverse effects on competition are not limited to higher prices and reduced
output. They can also include adverse effects on innovation incentives. In
both government and private suits against Intel in the late 1990s, the plaintiffs
charged that Intel had reduced competitors’ incentives to innovate by
demanding a royalty-free license to the patents of any company it did
business with. In particular, the FTC charged that Intel had cut off business
dealings with Intergraph, Compaq, and Digital Equipment Corporation, in
each case after the company sued or threatened to sue it for patent
infringement.198 The government alleged that the effect of Intel’s blanket
policy of demanding royalty-free licenses and refusing to deal with those who
sued it for patent infringement was to reduce others’ incentives to innovate in
the market Intel dominated, since they could not obtain revenue from
licensing patents to the most likely licensee.199 Similarly, Intergraph brought
a wide-ranging antitrust suit against Intel based on the same conduct. Both of
these claims were filed under Section 2, and both challenge Intel’s refusal to
continue dealing with Intergraph. However, they do not seem appropriately
within the scope of the Xerox rule, because the refusal to license is not
absolute. Rather, the license is conditioned on the licensee’s willingness to
grant a royalty-free license to its intellectual property to Intel.200
The resolution of these two cases differed. In the private action, the
Federal Circuit reversed a preliminary injunction against Intel.201 The court
rejected a wide variety of antitrust theories proffered by the plaintiffs,
including tying202 and the essential facilities doctrine.203 In rejecting
Intergraph’s monopolization claim, the court emphasized that Intergraph was
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an Intel customer, and sold products in a different, downstream market. Since
the companies were not direct competitors in product sales, the court
reasoned, Intel could not be held liable for monopolizing Intergraph’s
market.204 By contrast, the FTC suit ended with a consent decree in which
Intel agreed not to stop dealing with companies merely because they sued it
to enforce intellectual property rights. Intel reserved the right to end
relationships with companies for a variety of legitimate business reasons,
however.205
The strength of the economic theory behind these cases is uncertain. As an
initial matter, the Federal Circuit was almost certainly too facile in its
rejection of Intergraph’s claim. It is true that Intel and Intergraph are in a
vertical relationship in the products market, and that Intel has not made a
serious effort to integrate downstream into Intergraph’s market. As a result,
Intel cannot possibly be held liable for monopolizing the graphics
workstation market, where Intergraph competes. But that does not dispose of
the case. Intergraph owned patents that conferred rights in Intel’s core market
for microprocessors. Intel’s actions were designed to obtain a royalty free
license to those patents and therefore arguably to protect its dominance in the
microprocessor market. The Federal Circuit did not focus on Intergraph’s
ownership of intellectual property assets that competed directly with Intel.
But that fact seems critical to the case, as the FTC properly recognized.
Nonetheless, it does not necessarily follow that Intel has done anything
wrong. As we have seen, companies have a strong right to refuse to deal with
individual firms for any legitimate business reason or even for no reason at
all.206 And as the Federal Circuit observed, the fact that a company is suing
you would seem to be a legitimate reason to stop doing business with them.207
It would seem anomalous to insulate a company from termination by virtue of
the fact that it had sued its supplier, when companies with less adversarial
business relationships are not so protected. To the extent that Intergraph
complained merely of being terminated by Intel because it sued them,
therefore, we believe the Federal Circuit was right to reject the complaint.
The FTC alleged something more, however: a pattern of refusing to deal
with multiple buyers unless they grant Intel blanket access to their intellectual
property rights. The FTC’s Section 2 case further depended critically on the
facts that Intel had monopoly power in the microprocessor market, and that
the effect of its policy was to discourage innovation by actual or potential
competitors in that market208 by reducing or eliminating the value of their
intellectual property related to microprocessors. As a result, the FTC argued,
Intel helped maintain its monopoly in the microprocessor market by
discouraging leapfrogging innovations.209 We think the FTC’s claim is
critically dependent on proof of these facts. In particular, it is important to
distinguish the FTC’s allegations of an industry-wide pattern of conduct
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directed at discouraging innovation from the complaints of a single
terminated buyer.
Even with these limitations, the FTC’s theory is somewhat troubling.
Companies in many industries, including semiconductors, regularly enter into
royalty-free cross-licensing agreements. The law normally treats these
agreements as procompetitive because they free both parties to compete on
the merits without being restricted by overlapping or blocking patent
rights.210 To the extent Intel is attempting to avoid being ‘held up’ by
patentees making unreasonable claims, its demand for a license seems not
only legitimate but procompetitive.211 At a minimum, these possible
procompetitive effects must be taken into account before concluding that any
such licensing policy violates Section 2. Claims based on unilateral refusals
to license an intellectual property right are rarely successful in the US. Where
they are successful, it is normally because the refusal is not truly unilateral,
but represents an effort to condition a license on some anticompetitive end.
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The European Court of Justice did find a copyrighted television guide to be an essential
facility in the Magill case, C-241/91 P (E.C.J. 1995). That decision is discussed in this
book in Chapter 3 (see also Chapters 5, 8, 9).
195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id. at 1350. Most of those antitrust claims are based on Intel’s efforts to link the two sets of
intellectual property rights together. As such, they involve conditional rather than pure
unilateral refusals to deal.
Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
195 F.3d at 1356–1359.
Id. at 1357 (‘the essential facility theory is not an invitation to demand access to the
property or privileges of another, on pain of antitrust penalties and compulsion; thus the
courts have required anticompetitive action by a monopolist that is intended to “eliminate
competition in the downstream market”.’).
Id. (‘A non-competitor’s asserted need for a manufacturer’s business information does not
convert the withholding of that information into an antitrust violation’.). Cf. Multivideo
Labs v. Intel Corp., 2000 WL 502866 (SDNY 27 April 2000) (monopoly leveraging claim
fails where the parties are not competitors).
The court was arguably incorrect to conclude that the parties were not in the same market.
While Intergraph sold its products in a market downstream from Intel’s, Intergraph’s
intellectual property rights, the assertion of which triggered the dispute, were in the same
technology market as Intel’s primary line of business (microprocessors). The court’s
failure to recognize this doesn’t affect the essential facilities analysis, however, because
any such competition would exist in the market for the essential facility itself, not the
downstream market Intel was allegedly trying to control.
995 F. Supp. 728 (S.D. Tex. 1998).
Id. at 751.
Id. at 752.
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Id. at 754.
The court did not discuss the possibility that network effects could have economic
consequences for the market similar to those of natural monopolies.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 755.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 755–56.
719 F. Supp. 1551 (S.D. Fla. 1988); rev’d on other grounds 999 F.2d 1436 (11th Cir.
1993).
Id. at 1563. This conclusion was reversed on appeal.
Id. at 1566.
Aldridge, 995 F. Supp. at 755 n.146.
We detail these unusual circumstances in Section III.C.3, infra.
For more detail, see Areeva and Hovenkamp (supra Note 31), 3A Antitrust Law ¶¶ 771–
74, 787 (arguing that the essential facilities doctrine is generally unwarranted, but that an
exception may reasonably be made for public utilities).
Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 398 (2004).
See also United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642 (9th Cir. 1981)
(government challenged a refusal to deal on the ground that Mitsubishi had ‘become so
wedded to Westinghouse technology, because of the Agreements, as to be unable to
compete in the United States market.’).
See Section II.
See Section II.D.
Whether or not our per se rule is adopted, it should be clear that courts regularly reject
such claims. In addition to the cases discussed above, see Service & Training, Inc. v. Data
General Corp., 963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992) (‘a better mouse trap is not necessarily an
essential facility’.); Sun Dun, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 740 F. Supp. 381, 394 (D. Md. 1990)
(trademark is not an essential facility); Hudson’s Bay Co. v. American Legend Co-Op, 651
F. Supp. 819, 843 n.14 (DNJ 1986) (same).
274 F. Supp. 2d 743, 745 (D. Md. 2003).
No. C-3626 (FTC Nov. 14, 1995).
Id.
The Tunney Act, Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1706 (1974), codified as amended at 15
USC § 16(b)–(h) (1994), requires that courts approve such settlements as being in the
public interest. But the standard applied is quite lax. See United States v. Microsoft, 56
F.3d 1448 (DC Cir. 1995).
Indeed, this is plausibly what was at stake in BellSouth. While the district court concluded
that the organization of Bell’s yellow pages was copyrightable, the 11th Circuit ultimately
held otherwise.
Morris Communications Corp. v. PGA Tour, 364 F.3d 1288 (11th Cir. 2004); New York
Mercantile Exchange v. Intercontinental Exchange, Inc., 2004 WL 1494383 (SDNY 30
June 2004).
708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983).
326 US 1 (1945). For a full analysis of the case, see Hovenkamp, Herb (1995), ‘Exclusive
Joint Ventures and Antitrust Policy’, Colum. Bus. L. Rev., 1.
Areeda and Hovenkamp (supra Note 31) note that the case did not hold that AP must open
its network to all comers, just that it couldn’t discriminate against newspapers that
competed with existing members (3A Antitrust Law ¶ 772b2). While this is a point of
distinction from the typical essential facilities case, the nondiscrimination obligation the
Court did impose is certainly outside the realm of normal antitrust rules.
To similar effect are Drinkwine v. Federated Publications, Inc., 780 F.2d 735 (9th Cir.
1985) and TV Communications Network v. Turner Network Television, 964 F.2d 1022 (10th
Cir. 1992). In both cases the court rejected claims that a copyright owner controlled an
essential facility – an advertising tabloid in Drinkwine and a TV network in TV
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Communications. But both cases reject the claim on the antitrust merits, for failure to
prove market power, without mentioning the fact that the defendants in both cases produce
copyrighted works.
One case has permitted an essential facilities theory to survive a motion to dismiss without
discussing the copyrighted works that were doubtless involved in the case. In In re Evic
Class Action Litig., 2002 WL 1766554 (SDNY 31 July 2002), the court held that the
plaintiffs stated an antitrust claim that UPS forms and tracking software were essential
facilities to third parties who sought to compete with UPS in providing ‘excess value’
insurance for packages shipped by UPS. The UPS forms and software in question are
doubtless copyrighted, though the court makes no mention of the fact. Nonetheless, this
may be a case (like MCI) in which the copyrighted works are only incidental to the control
of the facility itself, particularly since copyright law does not forbid the creation of
interoperable programs.
Of course, in such a case the plaintiff will still have to meet the extremely high standards
for making out an essential facilities claim. The circumstances in which it will be able to
do so are extremely rare.
Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F.3d 390, 400 (7th Cir. 2000).
Id.; see also Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Bell Atlantic Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 738
(SDNY 2000).
See Section III.C.2.
540 US 398 (2004).
For good discussions of refusals to license intellectual property as antitrust violations, see
e.g. Donahey, Teague I. (2000), ‘At the Intersection of Antitrust and Intellectual Property:
Lessons from Intergraph v. Intel and CSU v. Xerox’, Fed. Cir. Bar J., 10, 129; Hayter,
Dana W. (1996), ‘When a License is Worse than a Refusal: A Comparative Competitive
Effects Standard to Judge Restrictions in Intellectual Property Licenses’, Berkeley Tech.
L.J., 11, 281; Kaufmann, Michael H. (1999), ‘Image Technical Services, Inc. v. Eastman
Kodak Co.: Taking One Step Forward and Two Steps Back in Reconciling Intellectual
Property Rights and Antitrust Liability’, Wake Forest L. Rev., 34, 471; Lao, Marina
(1999), ‘Unilateral Refusals to Sell or License Intellectual Property and the Antitrust Duty
to Deal’, Cornell J. L. & Pub. Pol’y, 9, 193; McGowan, David (1999), ‘Networks and
Intention in Antitrust and Intellectual Property’, J. Corp. L., 24, 485; Vermut, Richard S.
(1997), ‘A Synthesis of the Intellectual Property and Antitrust Laws: A Look at Refusals to
License Computer Software’, Colum.-VLA J. L. & Arts, 22, 27.
See Section II.C.
For a general discussion, see Antitrust Law (supra Note 31), 3A, ¶ 770.
We discuss such cases in Section III.F.
See e.g. Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 US 143 (1951).
See Section II.
See e.g. Abbott Labs. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (market power
conferred by IP rights cannot violate the antitrust laws; ‘the patent right must be coupled
with violations of §2’).
195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
See Section III.C.2.
195 F.3d at 1358 (citations omitted).
Id.
Id. at 1358–59. The court made no specific reference to Intel’s patents as a factor in this
decision, despite the district court’s determination that Intel had used its patents to restrain
trade, and that its patent rights did not immunize it from antitrust liability. See Intergraph
Corp. v. Intel Corp., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1255, 1279 (N.D. Ala. 1998).
203 F.3d 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (referred to herein as Xerox). To the extent it is relevant,
HH was consulted by the defendants in this case.
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106 Id. at 1326. Curiously, for this proposition the court quoted Image Technical Servs. v.
Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997), discussed below, which is itself the one
case that arguably does impose such liability.
107 Id. at 1327 (emphasis in original). See also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., 897
F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (extending patent rights beyond the scope of the grant
violates the antitrust laws).
108 Id. at 1328.
109 Id. at 1327.
110 See Miller Insituform Inc. v. Insituform of North Am., 830 F.2d 606, 609 (6th Cir. 1987)
(‘A patent hold who lawfully acquires a patent cannot be held liable under Section 2 of the
Sherman Act for maintaining the monopoly power he lawfully acquired by refusing to
license the patent to others.’); SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1206 (2d Cir.
1981) (‘where a patent has been lawfully acquired, subsequent conduct permissible under
the patent laws cannot trigger any liability under the antitrust laws.’).
111 203 F.3d at 1328–29.
112 36 F.3d 1147 (1st Cir. 1994).
113 Id. at 1184.
114 Id. at 1185–86. See also Rural Tel. Serv. Co. v. Feist Publications, Inc., 957 F.2d 765,
767–69 (evaluating the reasonableness of a copyright owner’s refusal to license telephone
white pages).
115 Id. at 1187. The court continued in a footnote: ‘Wary of undermining the Sherman Act,
however, we do not hold that an antitrust plaintiff can never rebut this presumption, for
there may be rare cases in which imposing antitrust liability is unlikely to frustrate the
objectives of the Copyright Act.’ Id. n.64.
To similar effect is Corsearch v. Thomson & Thomson, 792 F. Supp. 305, 323 (SDNY
1992) (noting in dictum that the enforcement of a copyright was a presumptively valid
business justification for a refusal to license).
116 Id. at 1188–89.
117 Xerox, 203 F.3d at 1329. Curiously, an earlier 9th Circuit case had held with little
discussion that a computer hardware manufacturer that owned a copyright in maintenance
software was free to refuse to provide that software to ISOs, a result that suggests an even
stronger presumption than Data General’s. See Triad Sys. Corp. v. Southeastern Express
Co., 64 F.3d 1330 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Advanced Computer Service v. MAI Sys. Corp.,
845 F. Supp. 356 (E.D. Va. 1994) (same).
118 125 F.3d 1195 (9th Cir. 1997). To the extent it is relevant, HH was consulted by the
defendants in this case.
119 Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 US 451 (1992).
120 125 F.3d at 1220.
121 Id. at 1215.
122 Id. at 1216.
123 Id. at 1216–17.
124 Id. at 1218.
125 The district court did not consider this issue at all, and did not give any instruction to the
jury regarding a presumption based on ownership of intellectual property rights. While the
Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in failing to give such an instruction, it found
that the court’s error was harmless because the facts of the case rebutted the presumption.
Id. at 1218–19.
126 The evidence of this is pretty clear; Kodak’s own employees testified that intellectual
property rights had nothing to do with their decision to cut off the ISOs. Id. at 1219–20.
We discuss the relevance of this evidence in Section III.D.4.a.
127 Id. at 1219.
128 Id. at 1217.
129 One court that recognized the rather stark change in the law wrought by Xerox is
Telecomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Comms., Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1365,
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1368–69 (N.D. Ga. 2000). That court reversed its prior decision, concluding that after
Xerox independent service organizations could not bring an antitrust claim based on an
effort to leverage power from the parts market into the service market. Ironically, while the
Telecomm court rendered its decision based on its belief that Federal Circuit law was
controlling, on appeal the Federal Circuit ordered the case transferred to the Eleventh
Circuit because of the Supreme Court’s intervening decision in Holmes v. Vornado, 535
US 826 (2002). Telecomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Comms., Inc., 295
F.3d 1249 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
In light of the different opinions, antitrust defendants may be expected to file patent
infringement claims wherever possible in order to vest jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit,
with its more lenient rules. While the Federal Circuit is likely to hear most of the patentrelated antitrust cases in the future, and has asserted authority over the antitrust rules to be
applied in such cases, that does not ameliorate the conflict problem. First, there is a clear
conflict between the circuits in their treatment of copyright issues. Second, not all patent
issues will be appealed to the Federal Circuit, both because some antitrust cases (like
Image Technical) do not involve patent infringement claims by either side, and because in
an important subset of patent-antitrust cases – those brought by federal or state agencies –
the case will not involve direct patent issues and will not be appealed to the Federal
Circuit.
203 F.3d at 1324.
See Section III.D.3.
See e.g. Olympia Equip. Leasing v. Western Union Telegraph, 797 F.2d 370 (7th Cir.
1986).
It is not clear why this is. Image Technical originally involved both tying and
monopolization claims, but only the monopolization claim went to the jury.
203 F.3d at 1327.
As noted above, the Federal Circuit in Xerox adopted the First Circuit approach for
copyrights. 203 F.3d at 1328–29.
By referring to these costs, we intend to encompass not only the increased costs of
litigation, but any reduction in innovation incentive attributable to the more uncertain
status of intellectual property rights.
See in particular Sections III.E to III.G.
472 US 585 (1985). The case is discussed in much more detail in Antitrust Law (supra
Note 31), 3A, ¶ 772c.
472 US at 585.
Id. at 601.
Id. at 602–03.
Cf. Hovenkamp, Herbert (2000), ‘The Monopolization Offense’, Ohio St. L.J., 61, 1035, at
pp. 1044–45 (Aspen is ‘problematic to say the least’).
Verizon Communications v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 US 398 (2004).
See SmileCare Dental Group v. Delta Dental Plan, 88 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996) (limiting
Aspen to continuations of existing ventures). Cf. Antitrust Law (supra Note 31), 3A, ¶
772c3 (‘We would at the very least restrict Aspen to circumstances where the defendant
terminated an existing joint venture without justification . . .’).
504 US 451 (1992).
As noted above, on remand Kodak did ultimately assert patents and copyrights.
36 F.3d at 1188.
United States Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission, Antitrust Guidelines
for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, § 2.3.
On the importance of the focus on the scope of intellectual property rights, see generally
Bowman, Ward S. Jr. (1973), Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal And Economic Appraisal;
Barton, John H. (1997), ‘Patents and Antitrust: A Rethinking in Light of Patent Breadth
and Sequential Innovation’, Antitrust L.J., 65, 449.
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151 Xerox, Kodak, and Data General all involved patents or copyrights. One court has held
that the irrebuttable Xerox presumption that a unilateral refusal to deal cannot be unlawful
does not extend to trade secrets. Telecomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Siemens Rolm
Comms., Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1370 (N.D. Ga. 2000). While the court was concerned
that the broad range of protectable trade secrets would mean that ‘virtually every
anticompetitive refusal to deal would be beyond reach of antitrust law’, we are not
convinced that trade secrets should be treated differently than other forms of intellectual
property. Indeed, there are good reasons to permit trade secret owners (and trademark
owners, though no court has addressed it) to refuse to license their rights, since the
continued existence of both trade secret and trademark rights will depend in part on how
licensees behave.
The key to avoiding too broad a rule is to determine whether the power exercised is within
the legitimate scope of the intellectual property right. While entitlement to trade secret
protection is broad, that protection is significantly less powerful than patent protection,
limiting the effect of permitting unilateral refusals to deal in trade secrets.
152 A separate question is presented when intellectual property enforcement litigation is itself
claimed to violate the antitrust laws. The filing of a lawsuit triggers Noerr-Pennington
immunity in most circumstances. (See Chapter 11 of IP and Antitrust, supra Note 1.) In
this case, however, we deal only with antitrust liability based on refusal to license or
provide access to information.
153 To the extent it is relevant, HH and ML were both consultants for the federal government
on this case.
154 1998 WL 614485 (DDC Sept. 14, 1998)
155 Id. at *15 (some citations omitted).
156 United States v. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30, 40 (DDC 2000).
157 The court also discussed Microsoft’s intent in imposing the restrictions. Properly read, we
think the court’s discussion of intent is relevant only to the underlying Section 2 claim, and
not to whether the intellectual property presumption has been rebutted. There is no
indication in the opinion that the court intended to take sides in the Image Technical–Xerox
debate discussed above.
158 Such efforts are quite common, particularly in the software industry. Software vendors
regularly include terms in their licenses purporting to bind licensees to rules more
restrictive than those imposed by copyright law. For examples of such terms, see Lemley,
Mark A. (1999), ‘Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual Property
Licensing’, Calif. L. Rev., 87, 111, at pp.124–136.
159 See e.g. Feist Pubs. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 US 340 (1991), Baker v. Selden, 101 US 99
(1880), 17 USC § 102(b).
160 17 USC §106.
161 17 USC §107.
162 See e.g. 17 USC § 111 (cable retransmissions), § 112(e) (digital music sound recordings),
§ 115 (cover license for musical compositions), § 116 (jukeboxes), § 118 (public
broadcasting), § 119 (satellite broadcast retransmissions).
163 35 USC §271(a).
164 See e.g. United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 US 241, 249 (1942); Glass Equip. Dev. v.
Besten, Inc., 174 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
165 See e.g. Boyden Power-Brake Co. v. Westinghouse, 170 US 537, 562 (1898); Scripps
Clinic & Res. Found. v. Genentech, Inc., 927 F.2d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
166 Accordingly, we think the court in Telecomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Siemens Rolm
Comms., Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1365, 1369 (N.D. Ga. 2000) read Xerox too broadly. The
court concluded that under Xerox a patent on parts necessarily included within its scope the
right to control service using those parts. This is not correct as a matter of patent law,
where the scope of a patent depends on its particular claims. The preferable approach is to
ask whether a restrictive license imposed a condition outside the scope of the particular
patent. If so, Xerox should not apply.
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167 See e.g. Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 323 US 386, 432–33 (1945); Scherer, F. M.
(1977), ‘The Economic Effects of Compulsory Patent Licensing’, in Monograph Series in
Finance and Economics , at p. 47 (N.Y.U. Graduate Sch. Bus. Admin. Center for Study
Fin. Inst. Monograph 1977-2, 1977) (documenting cases of compulsory licensing as an
antitrust remedy).
168 Thus, in United States v. Microsoft, it is important to distinguish between the
government’s claims that Microsoft violated the antitrust laws by refusing to allow
modifications to Windows 98 and the government’s request for compelled disclosure of
source code or applications program interfaces as an antitrust remedy. The former is within
the scope of this chapter, and is discussed in Section III.E; the latter is outside the scope of
this chapter.
169 We discuss those issues in more detail in Chapter 6 of IP and Antitrust (supra Note 1).
170 For a general discussion of this distinction, see 6 Antitrust Law (supra Note 31), vol. 6, ¶
1402.
171 See Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Res., 395 US 100, 135 (1969) (concerted refusal to
license patents was illegal, even if unilateral refusals would not have been).
172 In our treatise (supra Note 1), we discuss tying arrangements in Chapters 21–22, patent
pools and cross-licenses in Chapters 31, 33 and 34, grantback clauses in Chapter 25, and
field of use restrictions in Chapter 24.
173 203 F.3d at 1325.
174 Id. at 1327.
175 See, e.g., Image Technical, 125 F.3d at 1218 (discussing unilateral refusals to license).
176 We discuss Walker Process and sham litigation in detail in Chapter 11 of IP and Antitrust
(supra Note 1).
177 203 F.3d at 1327 (emphasis in original); see also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am.,
897 F.2d 1572, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (‘a patent owner may not take the property right
granted by a patent and use it to extend his power in the marketplace improperly, i.e.
beyond the limits of what Congress intended to give in the patent laws.’).
178 203 F.3d at 1327.
179 2000-1 Trade Cas. ¶72,890 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
180 We agree with David McGowan’s reading of the situation:
The Federal Circuit’s recent [Xerox] decision . . . is best read as affirming the
distinction between simple and conditional refusals. . . . [T]he exception the Federal
Circuit explicitly recognized for tying arrangements includes conditional agreements
that have the same possible economic effects – extending the economic power of a
patent beyond the scope of the patent grant.
David McGowan (2001), ‘Innovation, Uncertainty, and Stability in Antitrust Law’,
Berkeley Tech. L.J., 16 (2), 729–811 (also noting that a reading limited to tying cases
‘would make little economic sense’).
181 Eastman Kodak v. Image Technical Servs., 504 US 451, 480 n.29 (1992). The Court has
drawn the same line in the copyright context. See United States v. Loew’s, 371 US 38, 47–
48 (1962).
182 A somewhat broader statement of the conditional refusal – unilateral conduct distinction is
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981). There, the
court drew a distinction between acts which expand the patent monopoly and those which
merely enforce a patent right within its lawful scope. As examples of the former, the court
cited tying arrangements, block-booking agreements, price-restricted patent pools, and
acquisition of patents from third parties.
183 15 USC § 14.
184 See International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 US 392 (1947); see IP and Antitrust,
(supra Note 1) Chapter 21 (discussing tying arrangements).
185 For an extensive discussion of this issue in the law of tying, see Antitrust Law, vol. 10, ¶¶
1752–1757.
186 For a much more detailed discussion of this issue, see Antitrust Law, vol. 7, ¶¶ 1439–1458.
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See, e.g. United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 US 300, 307 (1919).
See generally Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Corp., 465 US 752 (1984).
963 F.2d 680 (4th Cir. 1992).
Id. at 686.
15 USC §14. Because it is limited to commodities, Section 3 of the Clayton Act will apply
to conditional transfers of goods embodying intellectual property, such as books, videos,
and computer disks, but not to pure licenses of intellectual property rights.
United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 63 (DC Cir. 2001) (en banc) (Microsoft IV).
Telecomm Technical Services, Inc. v. Siemens Rolm Comms., Inc., 150 F. Supp. 2d 1365,
1369 (N.D. Ga. 2000).
We discuss those limits in IP and Antitrust (supra Note 1), Chapters 20–36. See also
United States v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (9th Cir. 1981)
(distinguishing between a refusal to license to some parties, which is within the scope of
the patent grant, and tying or conditioning a patent license in a way that ‘seeks to expand
that monopoly by misuse, agreement, or accumulation’).
645 F.2d 1195 (2d Cir. 1981).
To trigger Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the acquisition of a patent must be from an
external source. Internal development of inventions that are then patented cannot give rise
to antitrust liability. See Automatic Radio Co. v. Hazeltine Res. Co., 339 US 827 (1950).
We discuss the legal standards for acquisition of intellectual property in Chapter 14 of IP
and Antitrust (supra Note 1).
In re Intel Corp., Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, FTC Dock.
No. 9288 (March 1999).
Id.
Evidence that the case should be treated differently from Xerox includes the fact that the
Federal Circuit decided the Intergraph case only three months before Xerox, yet clearly did
not articulate anything like a per se rule of legality. See Intergraph Corp. v. Intel Corp.,
195 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
Id.
For a discussion of the court’s tying holding, see IP and Antitrust (supra Note 1), §21.6.
For a discussion of the court’s essential facilities holding, see IP and Antitrust (supra Note
1), §3c2.
195 F.3d at 1357.
In re Intel Corp., Agreement Containing Consent Order §II.A-B, FTC Dock. No. 9288
(March 1999).
See IP and Antitrust (supra Note 1), §2c.
195 F.3d at 1356.
Digital Equipment Corporation, unlike Intergraph, was at the time a direct competitor of
Intel through its Alpha chip, as well as a purchaser of Intel’s microprocessor products.
This argument is similar to the competitive concerns raised by exclusive grantback clauses,
and indeed Intel’s alleged policy resembles a grantback clause in significant ways.
Significantly, however, Intel’s policy more closely resembles a non-exclusive grantback
clause, which is not normally thought to be a risk to competition.
See IP and Antitrust (supra Note 1), chapter 34 (discussing cross-licensing arrangements
and blocking patents).
The FTC consent decree attempted to take this concern into account. It permits Intel to cut
off any buyer who sues it for patent infringement and seeks injunctive relief rather than
damages. See In re Intel Corp., Agreement Containing Consent Order §II.A, FTC Dock.
No. 9288 (March 1999).

